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The Rights of Animals
Cass R. Sunsteint
I. DOGS, CATS, AND PRINCIPLE
There are nearly sixty million domestic dogs in the United States,
owned by over thirty-six million households. Over half of these
households give Christmas presents to their dogs. Millions of them
celebrate their dog's birthday. If a family's dog were somehow forced
to live a short and painful life, the family would undoubtedly feel
some combination of rage and grief. What can be said about dog own-
ers can also be said about cat owners, who are more numerous still.
But through their daily behavior, people who love those pets, and
greatly care about their welfare, help ensure short and painful lives for
millions, even billions of animals that cannot easily be distinguished
from dogs and cats. Should people change their behavior? Should the
law promote animal welfare? Should animals have legal rights? To an-
swer these questions, we need to step back a bit.
Many people think that the very idea of animal rights is implau-
sible. Suggesting that animals are neither rational nor self-aware, Im-
manuel Kant thought of animals as "man's instruments," deserving
protection only to help human beings in their relation to one another:
"[H]e who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with
men."' Jeremy Bentham took a different approach, suggesting that
mistreatment of animals was akin to slavery and racial discrimination:
The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may ac-
quire those rights which never could have been withholden from
them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already dis-
covered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human
being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a
tormentor.... [A] full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison
a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an in-
fant of a day, or a week, or even month, old. But suppose the case
t Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and
Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago. I am grateful to Emily Buss, Gary
Francione, Martha Nussbaum, Richard Posner, Janet Radcliffe Richards, and David Wolfson for
valuable comments on a previous draft. Alexandra Baj provided valuable research assistance.
1 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics 240 (Hackett 1963) (Louis Infield, trans).
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were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they
reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?2
John Stuart Mill concurred, repeating the analogy to slavery.'
Most people reject that analogy. But in the last ten years, the
animal rights question has moved from the periphery and toward the
center of political and legal debate. The debate is international. In
2002, Germany became the first European nation to vote to guarantee
animal rights in its constitution, adding the words "and the animals" to
a clause that obliges the state to respect and protect the dignity of
human beings. The European Union has done a great deal to reduce
animal suffering.' Within the United States, consumer pressures have
been leading to improved conditions for animals used as food.6 Not-
withstanding its growing appeal, the idea of animal rights has been
disputed with extraordinary intensity. Some advocates of animal rights
think that their adversaries are selfish, unthinking, cruel, even morally
blind. Some of those who oppose animal rights think that the advo-
cates are fanatical and even bizarre, willing to trample on important
human interests for the sake of rats and mice and salmon.
In this Essay I have three goals. The first is to reduce the intensity
of the debate by demonstrating that almost everyone believes in ani-
mal rights, at least in some minimal sense; the real question is what
that phrase actually means. My second goal is to give a clear sense of
the lay of the land-to show the range of possible positions, and to
explore what issues separate reasonable people. In this way, I attempt
to provide a kind of primer for current and coming debates. The third
goal is to defend a particular position about animal rights, one that,
like Bentham's, puts the spotlight squarely on the issues of suffering
and well-being.7 This position requires rejection or qualification of
2 Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation 310-11 n 1 (Prometheus
1988).
3 See John Stuart Mill, Whewell on Moral Philosophy, in John Stuart Mill and Jeremy
Bentham, Utilitarianism and Other Essays 228, 252 (Penguin 1987) (Alan Ryan, ed) (drawing
parallels between arguments advanced against Bentham's statement above and arguments of
slaveholders in the Americas).
4 John Hooper, German Parliament Votes to Give Animals Constitutional Rights, The
Guardian (London) 2 (May 18, 2002) (voting 543 to 19 in favor of the clause with 15 absten-
tions).
5 See note 22.
6 See John Keilman, Food Retailers Press for Humane Farming; Industry, Animal Activists
Reaching Some Suppliers, Chi Trib 9 (June 26, 2002) (describing efforts by trade groups to de-
velop and implement guidelines designed to promote improved treatment of animals by food
producers).
7 By putting the spotlight there, I do not mean to resolve a hard question: Whether an
animal that is subject to a life of deprivation, and that entirely adapts to that life, is nonetheless
being treated in a way that violates its rights. In brie, I believe that like a human being, an ani-
mal that adapts to deprivation has a reasonable ground for complaint, if the deprivation means
that its life is much worse than it might be. But I cannot discuss that issue here.
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some of the most radical claims by animal rights advocates, especially
those that stress the "autonomy" of animals, or that object to any hu-
man control and use of animals. But my position has radical implica-
tions of its own. It strongly suggests, for example, that there should be
extensive regulation of the use of animals in entertainment, scientific
experiments, and agriculture. It also suggests that there is a strong ar-
gument, in principle, for bans on many current uses of animals. In my
view, those uses might well be seen, one hundred years hence, as a
form of unconscionable barbarity. In this respect, I suggest that Ben-
tham and Mill were not wrong to offer an analogy between current
uses of animals and human slavery.
II. WHAT ANIMAL RIGHTS MIGHT ENTAIL
A. The Status Quo
If we understand "rights" to be legal protection against harm,
then many animals already do have rights, and the idea of animal
rights is not at all controversial. And if we take "rights" to mean a
moral claim to such protection, there is general agreement that ani-
mals have rights of certain kinds. Of course some people, including
Descartes, have argued that animals are like robots and lack emo-
tions-and that people should be allowed to treat them however they
choose.8 But to most people, including sharp critics of the idea of ani-
mal rights, this position seems unacceptable. Almost everyone agrees
that people should not be able to torture animals or to engage in acts
of cruelty against them. And indeed, state law contains a wide range of
protections against cruelty and neglect. We can build on existing law
to define a simple, minimal position in favor of animal rights: The law
should prevent acts of cruelty to animals.
In the United States, state anticruelty laws go well beyond pro-
hibiting beating, injuring, and the like, and impose affirmative duties
on people who have animals in their care. New York contains a repre-
sentative set of provisions. Criminal penalties are imposed on anyone
who transports an animal in a cruel or inhumane manner, or in such a
way as to subject it to torture or suffering, conditions that can come
about through neglect.9 People who transport an animal on railroads
or cars are required to allow the animal out for rest, feeding, and wa-
ter every five hours.'° Nonowners who have impounded or confined an
animal are obliged to provide good air, water, shelter, and food."
8 See Gary L. Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? 2, 73
(Temple 2000).
9 See NY Agr & Mkts Law § 359(1) (McKinney 1991 & Supp 2002).
10 See id at § 359(2).
1 Seeid at § 356.
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Those who abandon an animal in public places, including a pet, face
criminal penalties.'2 Another provision forbids people from torturing,
beating, maiming, or killing any animal, and also requires people to
provide adequate food and drink.'3 Indeed, it is generally a crime not
to provide necessary sustenance, food, water, shelter, and protection
from severe weather. New York, like most states, forbids overworking
an animal, or using the animal for work when she or he is not physi-
cally fit." Compare in this regard the unusually protective California
statute, which imposes criminal liability on negligent as well as inten-
tional overworking, overdriving, or torturing of animals.6 "Torture" is
defined not in its ordinary language sense, but to include any act or
omission "whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suf-
fering is caused or permitted."'
7
If taken seriously, provisions of this kind would do a great deal to
protect animals from suffering, injury, and premature death. But ani-
mal rights, as recognized by state law, are sharply limited, and for two
major reasons. First, enforcement can occur only through public
prosecution. If horses and cows are being beaten and mistreated at a
local farm, or if greyhounds are forced to live in small cages, protec-
tion will come only if the prosecutor decides to provide it. Of course
prosecutors have limited budgets, and animal protection is rarely a
high-priority item. The result is that violations of state law occur every
day. The anticruelty prohibitions sharply contrast, in this respect, with
most prohibitions protecting human beings, which can be enforced
both publicly and privately. For example, the prohibitions on assault
and theft can be enforced through criminal prosecutions, brought by
12 Seeidat § 355.
13 See id at § 353.
14 See State v Groseclose, 67 Idaho 71, 171 P2d 863, 864-65 (1946) (holding that a statute
defining failure to give "proper care and attention" to animals as a misdemeanor was not void
for vagueness); Griffith v State, 116 Ga 835, 43 SE 251, 252 (1903) (holding that a conviction
could be sustained even if cruelty to the animal was the result of willful omission or negligence);
Commonwealth v Lufkin, 89 Mass (7 Allen) 579, 581 (1863) (stating that malicious intent is not
required for finding animal cruelty); Reynolds v State, 569 NE2d 680, 682 (Ind App 1991) (up-
holding misdemeanor conviction for failure to provide adequate shelter, food, and water to a va-
riety of animals).
15 See NY Agr & Mkts Law § 353. See also State v Goodall, 90 Or 485, 175 P 857, 858
(1918) (upholding a misdemeanor conviction for saddling, riding, and driving a horse with an ul-
cerated sore on its back); State v Prince, 77 NH 581, 94 A 966 (1915) (upholding the constitution-
ality of a state statute prohibiting sale or exchange of animals unfit for labor); Commonwealth v
Wood, 111 Mass 408, 410 (1873) (stating that conviction is appropriate if the defendant know-
ingly and willingly overdrove his horse; intent to torture or abuse was not necessary).
16 See Cal Penal Code §§ 597(b), 599b (West 1999).
17 Cal Penal Code § 599b.
18 I do not discuss here the difficulties introduced by the fact that some statutes allow oth-
erwise unlawful acts if they are "necessary" or "justifiable."
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public officials, and also by injured citizens, proceeding directly against
those who have violated the law.
Second, the anticruelty provisions of state law contain extraordi-
narily large exceptions. They do not ban hunting, and generally they
do not regulate hunting in a way that is designed to protect animals
against suffering. Usually, they do not apply to the use of animals for
medical or scientific purposes. To a large degree, they do not apply to
the production and use of animals as food. 9 The latter exemption is
the most important. About ten billion animals are killed for food an-
nually in the United States; indeed, 24,000,000 chickens and some
323,000 pigs are slaughtered every day.' The cruel and abusive prac-
tices generally involved in contemporary farming are largely unregu-
lated at the state level.' Because the overwhelming majority of ani-
mals are produced and used for food, the coverage of anticruelty laws
is exceedingly narrow.
B. Enforcing Existing Rights
If the suffering of animals matters -and every reasonable person
seems to think that it does-we should be greatly troubled by these
limitations. The least controversial response would be to narrow the
"enforcement gap," by allowing private suits to be brought in cases of
cruelty and neglect. Reforms might be adopted with the limited pur-
pose of stopping conduct that is already against the law, so that the
law actually means, in practice, what it says on paper. Here, then, we
can find a slightly less minimal understanding of animal rights. On this
view, representatives of animals should be able to bring private suits to
ensure that anticruelty and related laws are actually enforced. If, for ex-
ample, a farm is treating horses cruelly and in violation of legal re-
quirements, a suit could be brought, on behalf of those animals, to
bring about compliance with the law.
In a sense, this would be a dramatic proposal. It might even be
understood to mean that animals should be allowed to sue in their
own name-and whoever the nominal plaintiff, there would be no
question that the suit was being brought to protect animals, not hu-
man beings. The very idea might seem absurd. But it is simpler and
more conventional than it appears. Of course any animals would be
represented by human beings, just like any other litigant who lacks
19 I am putting some complex interpretive questions to one side. The majority of state stat-
utes do not apply to farming, but some of them could, on their face, be so applied.
20 See David Wolfson, How the Fox Came to Be the Guardian of the Hen House: Animal,
Agribusiness and the Law: A Modern American Fable, in Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C.
Nussbaum, eds, Animal Rights: Law and Policy (forthcoming 2003).
21 See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation 95-157 (Ecco 2002) (describing local farming condi-
tions and standards).
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ordinary (human) competence; for example, the interests of children
are protected by prosecutors, and also by trustees and guardians in
private litigation brought on children's behalf.
Why should anyone oppose an effort to promote greater en-
forcement of existing law, by supplementing the prosecutor's power
with private lawsuits? Perhaps the best answer lies in a fear that some
or many of those lawsuits would be unjustified, even frivolous. Per-
haps animal representatives would bring a flurry of suits, not because
of cruelty or neglect or any violation of law, but because of some kind
of ideological commitment to improving animal welfare in a way that
might go well beyond what the law actually says. Or perhaps this
would be a poor use of the resources of the legal system in general.
Perhaps other problems have more priority. If these are genuine risks,
the best response would be not to ban those lawsuits, but to make
those who bring frivolous ones pay the defendants' attorneys fees. It is
hard to defend the claim that cruelty to or abuse of animals, when it
occurs, has such low priority that it should not be addressed at all. Of
course there would be issues in deciding on the identity of representa-
tives and choosing the people who would pick them. But we are not
yet in especially controversial territory. Many of those who ridicule
the idea of animal rights typically believe in anticruelty laws, and they
should strongly support efforts to ensure that those laws are actually
enforced.
C. Increased Regulation of Hunting, Science, Farming, and More
But I think that we should go further. We should focus attention
not only on the "enforcement gap," but also on the areas where cur-
rent law offers little or no protection. In short, the law should impose
further regulation on hunting, scientific experiments, entertainment, and
(above all) farming to ensure against unnecessary animal suffering. It is
easy to imagine a set of initiatives that would do a great deal here, and
indeed European nations have moved in just this direction. There are
many possibilities.
Federal law might, for example, require scientists to justify ex-
periments on animals by showing, in front of some kind of committee
or board, that (a) such experiments are actually necessary or promis-
ing and (b) the animals involved will be subjected to as little suffering
as possible. Some steps have already been taken in this direction, but
it would be reasonable to go much further. If dogs or chimpanzees are
going to be used to explore some medical treatment, it should be nec-
essary to ensure that they will be decently fed and housed. Similar
controls might be imposed on agriculture. If cows, hens, and pigs are
going to be raised for use as food, they should be treated decently in
terms of nutrition, space requirements, and overall care. European na-
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tions have taken significant steps of this sort.2 The European Union,
for example, has decided to ban the standard bare wire cage for hens,
and to require that they be provided with access to a perch and nest-
ing box for laying eggs.3
If we focus on suffering, as I believe we should, it is not necessar-
ily impermissible to kill animals and use them for food; but it is en-
tirely impermissible to be indifferent to their interests while they are
alive. So too for other animals in farms, even or perhaps especially if
they are being used for the benefit of human beings. If sheep are going
to be used to create clothing, their conditions should be conducive to
their welfare. We might ban hunting altogether, at least if its sole pur-
pose is human recreation. (Should animals be hunted and killed sim-
ply because people enjoy hunting and killing them? The issue would
be different if hunting and killing could be justified as having impor-
tant functions, such as control of populations, the search for food, or
protection of human beings against animal violence.)
As a minimal reform step, it would even be possible to imagine a
system in which companies disclosed their practices, either voluntarily
or as part of a mandate. Companies that protected animals from suf-
fering, and ensured decent conditions, might publicize that fact, and
attempt to receive a market boost from the practices. Companies that
treated animals cruelly, and were forced to disclose that fact, might
well be punished by consumers.
I believe that steps in this direction would make a great deal of
sense. But here things become far more controversial. Why is this?
Partly it is because of sheer ignorance, on the part of most people,
about what actually happens to animals in (for example) farming and
scientific experimentation. I am confident that much greater regula-
tion would be actively sought if current practices were widely known.
Partly the controversy is a product of the political power of the rele-
vant interests, which intensely resist regulation. But legitimate ques-
22 Under its Common Agricultural Policy, the European Union adopted the European
Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes on November 17, 1978.
Council Decision of 19 June 1978, 21 Off J Eur Communities, No L 323/12 (Nov 17, 1978). The
Convention applies to the "keeping, care and housing of animals, and in particular to animals in
modem intensive stock-farming systems." 21 Off J Eur Communities, No L 323/15. In Articles 3
to 7, the Convention provides detailed principles of animal welfare. See id. The Convention was
amended and strengthened on December 31, 1992. See Protocol of Amendment to the European
Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, 35 Off J Eur Communities,
No L 395/22 (Dec 31, 1992). Under the Convention, the EU has established specific regulations
for such activities as the keeping of laying hens. Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999,42
Off J Eur Communities, No L 203/53 (Aug 3, 1999). Members of the European Union have en-
acted implementing legislation. The United Kingdom Department for Environment, Food, and
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) has been active. See DEFRA Homepage, online at
http://www.defra.gov.uk (visited on Nov 1, 2002).
23 See 42 Off J Eur Communities, No L 203/53.
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tions might be raised about these regulatory strategies for one simple
reason: The legitimate interests of animals and the legitimate interests
of human beings are in conflict in some of these areas. Here as else-
where, additional regulation would be costly and burdensome. Regula-
tion of scientific experiments on animals may lead to fewer experi-
ments- and hence to less in the way of scientific and medical progress.
If farms are regulated, the price of meat will increase, and people will
be able to eat less meat. Hence it is necessary to weigh the gain to
animal welfare against the harms to human beings. If the health of
human beings could be seriously compromised by regulation of ex-
periments on animals and farming, there is reason to engage in some
balancing before supporting that regulation.
Any such balancing must depend, in part, on values-on how
much weight we should assign to the relevant interests. At the very
least, I suggest that suffering and harm to animals should count, and
that any measures that impose suffering and harm should be convinc-
ingly justified. The mere hedonic gain provided by improved cosmetics
and perfume does not seem sufficient to justify the infliction of real
suffering. Eating beef might well fall into the same category. To make
a sensible assessment, it would be helpful to know a great deal about
the facts, not only about values. One of the most important disputes in
the domain of scientific experimentation is whether and to what ex-
tent the relevant experiments really hold out a great deal of promise
for medical progress. If we are speaking of perfumes, the claim for im-
posing suffering on animals is ludicrously weak. But if scientists are
able to develop treatments for AIDS and cancer, or even treatment
for serious psychological ailments, the claim is much stronger.
Now some animal rights advocates might urge that even if the
gains from a certain practice are very large, experiments are not justi-
fied. We do not, after all, allow scientists to experiment on human be-
ings, even human beings with serious disabilities, when and because
medical advances would be significant. Indeed, scientists are not per-
mitted to experiment on human beings who are incapable of con-
sciousness, or of suffering, because of some permanent incapacitation.
Should research be permitted on such people? If not, a simple answer
would be that the research would be intolerable to friends and family
members. But what if the research would have great benefits? Should
any balancing be permitted? And what if some of those who are per-
manently incapacitated lack friends and family members?
It is not so clear, in my view, that an assessment of social conse-
quences, and of possible benefits, is irrelevant to the judgment
whether to allow medical experiments in such circumstances. Perhaps
the firm moral prohibition is best supported by the suggestion that
any power to experiment on permanently incapacitated human beings
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would be hard to limit in practice, and that we do better, all things
considered, never to investigate consequences in particular cases. It
seems to me difficult to justify a similar prohibition on any experimen-
tation on nonhuman animals. I believe that it would be excessive to
ban experiments that impose a degree of suffering on rats or mice if
the consequence of those experiments would be to produce significant
medical advances for human beings (and ultimately nonhuman ani-
mals as well).
D. Eliminating Current Practices, Including Meat-Eating
Now turn to some more radical suggestions. Suppose that we con-
tinue to believe that animal suffering is the problem that should con-
cern us, and that we want to use the law to promote animal welfare.
We might conclude that certain practices cannot be defended and
should not be allowed to continue, if, in practice, mere regulation will
inevitably be insufficient -and if, in practice, mere regulation will en-
sure that the level of animal suffering will remain very high. Many
people who urge radical steps-who think, for example, that people
should not eat meat-do so because they believe that without such
steps, the level of animal suffering will be unacceptably severe. To
make such an argument convincing, it would be helpful to argue not
only that the harms to animals are serious, but also that the benefits to
human beings are simply too small to justify the continuation of those
practices.
To evaluate an argument of this kind, there is no choice but to go
area by area. Consider greyhound racing. Greyhounds live in miser-
able conditions and many of them are put to death after their racing
careers are over. I believe that if possible, the preferred step should be
to use the law to ensure that greyhounds are given decent lives-and
to hope that the racing industry will comply with the law. But if it
proves impractical for the law to ensure that greyhounds live mini-
mally decent lives,4 I believe that greyhound racing should be abol-
ished. The entertainment gain, for some people, cannot justify signifi-
cant suffering.
Of course the largest issue involves eating meat. I believe that
meat-eating would be acceptable if decent treatment were given to
the animals used for food. Killing animals, whether troubling or not,
seems far less troubling than inflicting suffering." If, as a practical mat-
ter, animals used for food are almost inevitably going to endure terri-
24 This might be because it is not feasible to provide decent care for greyhounds and to run
a profitable racing business.
25 Note, however, that in the human context our moral intuitions seem exactly opposite. I
cannot sort out this incongruity in this Essay.
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ble suffering, then there is a good argument that people should not eat
meat, at least if a refusal to eat meat will reduce that suffering. Of
course a legal ban on meat-eating would be extremely radical, and like
prohibition, it would undoubtedly create black markets and have a set
of bad, and huge, side effects. But the principle seems clear: People
should be much less inclined to eat meat if their refusal to do so would
prevent significant suffering.
There is an objection, utilitarian in spirit, to steps of this kind. If
people do not eat meat, or if they take other steps to prevent farm
animals from suffering, the inevitable result will be to ensure that
fewer animals exist. Perhaps it is objectionable to protect animals
through measures that reduce the total number of animals. Perhaps it
is better for animals to have lives, even difficult ones, than not to have
lives. But I think that this objection is weak. We should increase the
likelihood that animals will have good lives. We should not try to en-
sure that there are as many animals as possible.
My argument-that we should seriously consider refraining from
certain practices if this is the only feasible way to prevent widespread
suffering-raises a host of questions. As before, the argument raises is-
sues of fact. Shouldn't it be possible to reduce the level of suffering in
scientific experiments by, for example, requiring animals to be ade-
quately sheltered and fed? Why couldn't farms generally give their
animals decent lives, as many farms now do? It would also be valuable
to ask some factual questions. If vegetarianism were widespread,
would human health be undermined (as many contend) or improved
(as many also contend)? After the factual questions are resolved, dis-
putes will remain about the weight to be given to the various interests.
My suggestion is that on a reasonable reading of the facts, many prac-
tices will have to yield.
E. The Question of Animal Autonomy
Of course some people go further. They focus not only, and per-
haps not mostly, on the relief of suffering. On one view, animals have
rights in the sense that they should not be subject to human use and
control. Notice that this is not a Bentham-inspired point about the
prevention and relief of suffering. It is instead a suggestion that ani-
mals deserve to have a kind of autonomy. And the suggestion can be
seen to go well beyond the view, which seems to me correct, that ani-
mals should be seen as ends rather than solely as means. Many people
who use chimpanzees in entertainment or zoos, or who use horses for
racing, do not consider the relevant animals to be mere means to hu-
man ends. They agree that animals have intrinsic as well as instrumen-
tal value. But those who think that animals should not be subject to
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human control tend to object to all of these uses. They want all or most
animals to be able to make their own choices, free from human control.
This claim raises many questions. In the end it seems to me only
partly correct, because it neglects the possibility that animals will have
bad lives under natural conditions, and much better lives under a de-
gree of human control. Recall that both Bentham and Mill thought
that there was an analogy between human slavery and the mistreat-
ment of animals. Because Bentham and Mill were utilitarians, their fo-
cus was on suffering, not on violations of autonomy. But it might be
objected, to current practices, that animals are deprived of the ability
to choose, and that this is a distinctive and unacceptable harm,
whether or not it causes suffering.
Is there an analogy between slavery and current treatment of
animals? Should animals have a right to choose as they wish, or at
least more of a right to free choice? Begin with the case of companion
animals. Dogs and cats, among others, have been bred specifically for
human companionship, and many of them would not fare well on their
own. Perhaps those who believe in animal autonomy would accept the
idea that people can substantially control animals that have been bred
to live with them. On this view, domesticated animals cannot be
treated as slaves; they are not means to our ends. But they should be
controlled, and their choices should be limited, to the extent necessary
for their own well-being, as well as for the protection of others against
injury and harm.
But even if this is accepted, the idea of animal autonomy is not so
peculiar after all. Owners of dogs and cats care about the desires of
the animals who live with them; they permit both dogs and cats to
make countless free choices every day. On this view, the autonomy ar-
gument applies in a constrained form to domesticated animals, allow-
ing much in the way of free choice, but also allowing limits to protect
both animals themselves and third parties. In this sense, the autonomy
of domesticated animals is limited but real, in the same family as
autonomy of young children.
Perhaps the autonomy argument, then, applies in its full form
only to wild animals-forbidding human beings from hunting, trap-
ping, and confining them. Perhaps wild animals should be free from
human constraint. Undoubtedly it is true that many forms of trapping
and confining are impossible to justify and should therefore be
stopped. But what if certain practices, such as confinement in zoos,
science labs, and other facilities, can be undertaken in a way that en-
sures good lives for the relevant animals? What if some animals, in-
cluding dolphins and elephants, do very well under human control?
Nature can be very cruel, after all, and many animals will live longer
lives with human beings than in the wild. We should not say that what
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is natural for animals is necessarily what is good. Of course longer
lives are not necessarily better. But good zoos and similar institutions
have breeding programs that protect endangered species, give good
care to animals, and serve an important function (for nonhuman ani-
mals and human beings alike) in educating people about the nature
and worth of animals.
Indeed we could imagine that many lions, elephants, giraffes, and
dolphins will, in fact, have better lives with human assistance, even if
confined, than in their own habitats. They are not slaves, but they are,
in a sense, imprisoned. If their lives are nonetheless good, it is difficult
to see what sort of response might be made by those who believe in
animal autonomy. Perhaps autonomy advocates disagree on the facts,
not on the theoretical issue, and think it highly unlikely, in most cases,
that wild animals can have decent lives under human control. I do not
believe that they are correct on the facts. In any case, the claim for
animal autonomy must, in the end, depend on an assessment of what
will give animals good lives.
I have not answered that complex question here. Certainly ani-
mals, both domesticated and wild, should be able to make many
choices on their own. Equally certainly, it is legitimate to interfere
with the autonomy of animals if the interference can be justified in the
interest of animals themselves, or of vulnerable third parties. For hu-
man beings, slavery is unacceptable in part because human beings
cannot have genuinely decent lives if they are permanently subjected
to the will of others, and this is because of the kind of creature that a
human being is. On this count, many nonhuman animals are different;
they can have decent lives, or very good lives, even if they are subject
to external control (so long as the control is undertaken with their in-
terests in mind). But these are brief remarks on a difficult subject,
which I do not pretend to have sorted out here.
III. ARE ANIMALS PROPERTY?
I have not yet explored the ongoing debate over the status of
animals as "property." This is one of the most vigorous disputes of all.26
What underlies this debate?
There is no single answer. Those who insist that animals should
not be seen as property might be making a simple and modest claim:
Human beings should not be able to treat animals however they wish.
Their starting point seems to be this: If you are property, you are, in
law and in effect, a slave, wholly subject to the will of your owner.
Mere property cannot have rights of any kind. A table, a chair, or a
26 For a general discussion, see Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for
Animals (Perseus 2000).
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stereo can be treated as the owner likes; it can be broken or sold or
replaced at the owner's whim. For animals, it might be thought, the
status of property is devastating to actual protection against cruelty
and abuse.
On this view, a central goal of the modern animal rights move-
ment - eliminating the idea that animals are property-can be taken
in a modest way, as an effort to remove a legal status that inevitably
promotes suffering. But the goal can be taken far more ambitiously, as
an effort to say that animals should have rights of self-determination,
or a certain kind of autonomy. Hence some people urge that certain
animals, at least, are "persons," not property, and that they should
have many of the legal rights that human beings have.27 Of course this
does not mean that those animals can vote or run for office. Their
status would be akin to that of children-a status commensurate with
their capacities. What that status is, particularly, remains to be spelled
out. But at a minimum, it would seem to entail protection against tor-
ture, battery, and even confinement (except for purposes of human
self-defense).'
There is, however, a puzzle here. What does it mean to say that
animals are property and can be "owned"? As we have seen, animals,
even if owned, cannot be treated however the owner wishes; the law
already forbids cruelty and neglect. Ownership is just a label, connot-
ing a certain set of rights and also duties, and without knowing a lot
more, we cannot identify those rights and duties. A state could dra-
matically increase enforcement of existing bans on cruelty and neglect
without turning animals into persons, or making them into something
other than property. A state could do a great deal to prevent animal
suffering without banning the ownership of animals. We could even
grant animals a right to bring suit without insisting that animals are in
some general sense "persons," or that they are not property. A state
could certainly confer rights on a pristine area, or a painting, and allow
people to bring suit on its behalf, without therefore saying that that
area and that painting may not be owned. In the context of children's
rights, the assertion that "children are not property" is universally ac-
cepted, but appears not to have added anything to debates over how
parents may treat children.
What, then, are the real stakes in the debate over whether ani-
mals are "property"? Perhaps it is thought necessary to destroy the
idea of ownership in order to make, simply and all at once, a statement
that the interests of animals count, and have weight independent of
the interests of human beings. Rhetoric can matter, and in my view,
27 See id at 267.
28 Note that young children are confined.
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the idea of "property" does fit very poorly with how people should
think, on reflection, about other living creatures. On this view, the de-
bate over whether animals are property is really a debate over the
more specific issues discussed above. If getting rid of the idea that
animals are property is helpful in reducing suffering, then we should
get rid of that idea.
IV. WHICH ANIMALS HAVE RIGHTS?
There is a large question in the background. People do not see all
animals in the same way. They might agree that human beings should
protect the interests of dogs, cats, horses, and dolphins; they are
unlikely to think the same about ants and mosquitoes and cock-
roaches; rats and mice and squirrels seem to be intermediate cases. An
objection often raised against those who believe in animal rights is
that their position would lead to truly ludicrous conclusions-to the
(apparently ridiculous) suggestion that people cannot kill ants or
mosquitoes, or rid their houses of rats and cockroaches.
There are two ways to answer this objection. One way, of special
appeal to those who stress autonomy, would inquire into the cognitive
capacities of the particular animals involved. We would draw the line
by seeing how well the animals in question think.2 But this seems to
me misdirected; Bentham was right to place the emphasis on whether
and to what extent the animal in question is capable of suffering. If
rats are able to suffer-and no one really doubts that they are-then
their interests are relevant to the question how they can be expelled
from houses.3° At the very least, people should kill rats in a way that
minimizes suffering. And if possible, people should try to expel rats in
a way that does not harm them at all.
These claims need not be taken as radical or extreme; many peo-
ple already take steps in just this direction. If we are getting rid of rats,
we do so in a way that reduces, rather than maximizes, their distress.
On this view, if ants and mosquitoes have no claim to human con-
cern-if they can be killed at our whim-it is because they suffer little
or not at all. Here we have some empirical questions about the capaci-
ties of creatures of various sorts. And we should certainly be willing to
engage in a degree of balancing. If human beings are at risk of illness
and disease from mosquitoes and rats, they have a strong justification,
perhaps even one of self-defense, for eliminating or relocating them.
29 See Steven M. Wise, Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights 236
(Perseus 2002) ("As the minds of nonhuman animals resemble less and less the minds of human
preschoolers, toddlers, and infants,.., the argument for [e]quality rights weakens").
30 If an animal carries disease, the issue is different; in that case expulsion can be seen as a
matter of self-defense.
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The legal protection to be accorded to animals does, of course,
depend on the kind of creatures that they are. Dogs and horses should
not have the right to vote; but they should have a right to good lives
for dogs and horses. Animals with less developed cognitive capacities
deserve rights of a different sort. There is no blueprint here. My sug-
gestion is only that the rights that animals deserve should be related
to their capacities.
CONCLUSION
Every reasonable person believes in animal rights. Even the
sharpest critics of animal rights support the anticruelty laws. I have
suggested that the simple moral judgment behind these laws is that
animal suffering matters. This judgment supports a significant amount
of reform. Most modestly, private suits should be permitted to prevent
illegal cruelty and neglect. There is no good reason to give public offi-
cials a monopoly on enforcement; that monopoly is a recipe for con-
tinued illegality. Less modestly, anticruelty laws should be extended to
areas that are now exempt from them, including scientific experiments
and farming. There is no good reason to permit the level of suffering
that is now being experienced by millions, even billions of living crea-
tures.
I have also raised doubts about the radical idea that animals de-
serve to have "autonomy," understood as a right to be free from hu-
man control and use. In my view, the real questions involve animal
welfare and suffering: Although animals are not means to our ends,
human control may be compatible with decent lives for animals. But,
the emphasis on suffering, and on decent lives, itself has significant
implications. Of course it is appropriate to consider human interests in
the balance, and sometimes our interests will outweigh those of other
animals. The problem is that most of the time, the interests of animals
are not counted at all-and that once they are counted, many of our
practices cannot possibly be justified. I believe that in the long run,
our willingness to subject animals to unjustified suffering will be seen
as a form of unconscionable barbarity-not the same as, but in some
ways morally akin to, slavery and the mass extermination of human
beings.
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